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Summary  
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) reviews possible miscarriages of 
justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland when applicants have exhausted 
other avenues of appeal, with a view to referring unsafe convictions back to the 
appeal court.5 This article considers the CCRC’s handling of applications from 
refugees and asylum seekers who claim to have been wrongly convicted of 
entering the United Kingdom (UK) illegally. These cases commonly relate to 
people who could not obtain travel documents lawfully and were erroneously 
advised by defence lawyers that they should plead guilty. The article first 
examines the sources of these wrongful convictions by reviewing CCRC referrals 
to the appeal court. It then reviews the CCRC’s wider engagement with other 
criminal justice agencies in an effort to prevent further wrongful convictions of 
refugees and asylum seekers. The failing of the criminal justice agencies to 
properly protect refugees and asylum seekers reflects a wider anxiety about the 
negative effects of immigration, and the societal appetite to use punitive 
measures to control immigration. The article concludes by arguing that the 
CCRC’s campaign was effective, and demonstrates the importance of inter-
agency communication in preventing miscarriages of justice. 
 
 
Protection for refugees and asylum seekers – in law and in practice 
 
The core principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention is non-refoulement, which 
asserts that refugees should not be returned to a country where they face serious 
threats to their lives or freedom. Once refugees enter their destination country, 
Article 31(1) of the Convention protects them from being punished for breaking 
immigration rules:  
                                                        
1 This article was made possible by the University of Oxford John Fell Fund ‘The CCRC’s Response 
to Wrongfully Convicted Asylum Seekers’, 2015 (project number: BAD08360) and the 
Leverhulme Trust Research Project Grant ‘Last Resorts: Decisions and Discretion at the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission’, 2013–2015. The authors would like to thank the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission for their cooperation with this research. Thanks are also due to our 
anonymous reviewers and Professor Paul Almond for their insightful comments. 
2 School of Law, University of Reading. Email: m.sato@reading.ac.uk 
3 Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford. 
4 School of Law, University of Manchester.  
5 While most CCRC cases are referred back to the Court of Appeal, convictions from the 
Magistrates’ Courts are referred back to the Crown Court. Many of the ‘asylum cases’ fall into this 
category and so here we refer to the appeal court, to include both. 
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The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their 
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in 
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.  
 
The Convention therefore guarantees that refugees entering a contracting state 
will not be returned to their country of origin, and that they will not be punished 
for violating immigration laws upon entry. This protection extends to those with 
a confirmed refugee status as well as to ‘presumptive refugees’ (or asylum 
seekers) – people who have not yet had this status granted by a state but are in 
the process of seeking it.6 The protection does not extend to migrants who do not 
come ‘directly’ from a persecuting state, fail to present themselves ‘without 
delay’ to authorities, or fail to show good cause for illegal entry.  
 
The UK has been a signatory to the Refugee Convention since 1954,7 and the 
Convention was incorporated into domestic law under section 31 of the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The Act was introduced after the landmark 
case of Adimi.8 In this case, three asylum seekers were convicted of using false 
documents under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and two with the 
further offence of attempting to obtain air services by deception under the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981. The court quashed their convictions, concluding 
that punishing illegal entry goes against the principle of Article 31, which was 
intended to provide ‘immunity for genuine refugees whose quest for asylum 
reasonably involved them in breaching the law’.9 Section 31 (1) of the 1999 Act 
provides a statutory defence against a list of identity- and immigration-related 
offences relevant to refugees and asylum seekers.10 While the 1999 Act provides 
a statutory defence, it does not prohibit the CPS from starting criminal 
proceedings against asylum seekers, as long as their cases are not concluded 
                                                        
6 The term ‘presumptive refugees’ was used in R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court ex parte Adimi 
[1999] EWHC Admin 765. 
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘States Parties to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol’ (no date) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-
1967-protocol.html>.  
8 R v Uxbridge Magistrates Court ex parte Adimi [1999] EWHC Admin 765. 
9 Ibid, para 15. 
10 Section 31 (3) provides a list of offences that benefit from a defence under the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999. They include forgery and connected offences under Part 1 of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981, seeking to obtain or obtaining leave to enter the UK by deception under 
Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971, possessing false or making alterations to genuine leave 
documents under section 26(1)(d) of the Immigration Act 1971, and possessing false identity 
documents with improper intention and without reasonable excuse under Sections 25(1) and (5) 
of the Identity Card Act 2006 (for offences committed up until 21 January 2011) and section 4(1) 
and 6(1) of the Identity Documents Act 2010 (for offences committed after 21 January 2011). 
Home Office, ‘Section 31 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999: Defence against Prosecution’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/488492/S3
1_Def_against_prosv4.0_EXT_clean.pdf>. 
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before their refugee status is determined.11 In this sense, the incorporation of 
Article 31 into the 1999 Act, which was to provide a statutory defence rather 
than to guarantee immunity from prosecution, has been described as having 
‘restricted domestic effect’.12 
 
Five years after the Refugee Convention was formally recognised under domestic 
law in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 was introduced. Section 2 of the 2004 
Act created an offence of a person not having an immigration document at a 
leave or asylum interview upon entering the UK.13 According to the CPS, this 
legislation is intended to discourage people from concealing their identity by 
destroying their immigration documents en route in order to increase their 
chances of remaining in the UK.14  
 
An interesting question arises as to how the 2004 Act is interpreted in light of 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention and section 31 of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999. In the case of Kapoor and Ors,15 the appeal court held that 
section 2 of the 2004 Act ‘merely controls or regulates the entitlement to be in 
the UK and therefore cannot be relied upon as the immigration law which has 
been breached.’16 This means Article 31 and section 31 are not applicable to 
offences under section 2 of the 2004 Act and do not provide a defence.17 In other 
words, a person who has a successful asylum claim can still be found guilty 
under section 2 of the 2004 Act.  
 
There are separate statutory defences available, however, under the 2004 Act. 
They include being a European Economic Area national or being a family 
member of a European Economic Area national; having a reasonable excuse for 
not being in possession of a document; proving that a false immigration 
document has been used throughout the journey to the UK; or having travelled to 
the UK without any immigration documents (sections 2(4) and 2(5) of the 2004 
Act). In Soe Thet v DPP,18 the court – extending the reach of the 2004 Act – held 
that Thet had a reasonable excuse for not being in possession of a genuine travel 
document because he had been a political prisoner in Burma and had been 
unable to obtain a passport in his country. Similarly, a lack of issuing facility or 
                                                        
11 Ana Aliverti, Crimes of Mobility: Criminal Law and the Regulation of Immigration (Routledge 
2014). 
12 Gary Christie, ‘Prosecuting the Persecuted in Scotland: Article 31 (1) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the Scottish Criminal Justice System’ (2016), p 1, 
<http://www.scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/0783/SRC_Article_13_Report_2016_FI
NAL.pdf>. 
13 The offences under Section 2 the 2004 Act carry a maximum penalty of two years’ 
imprisonment on indictment or a fine, or both. The length of imprisonment for a guilty plea with 
no aggravating features has ranged from 2 to 10 months. Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Legal 
Guidance – Immigration’ (no date) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/immigration/>. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Kapoor and Ors [2012] EWCA Crim 435. 
16 Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance – Immigration. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Soe Thet v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] EWHC 2701 (Admin). 
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not knowing where to go for a genuine passport is also considered a defence 
under the 2004 Act, according to the case of Mohammed and Osman.19  
 
Overall, refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ legal protection (from punishment for 
illegal entry and presence) appears to be in place. While these individuals are not 
immune from prosecution, Article 31 of the Refugee Convention has been 
incorporated into domestic law by way of statutory defence under section 31 of 
the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The 2004 Act also allows prosecution of 
those not able to present their immigration documents at asylum interviews, but 
again offers a statutory defence within  that same Act.  
 
In practice, however, there was a punitive turn from the late 1990s, under the 
Labour government, towards prosecuting and criminalising migrants. Between 
1997 and 2010, when the Labour government was in power, 84 new 
immigration-related offences were created compared to only 70 offences during 
the 91 years from 1905 to 1996.20 Coupled with these new laws, the UK Border 
Agency was set up in 2008 to enforce the law and tackle abuse in the asylum 
system.21 The increased reliance on criminal law in dealing with migration 
resulted in a 54% increase in immigration-related charges in the magistrates’ 
courts between 2004 and 2005.22 These charges were largely linked to people 
failing to produce a valid passport upon entry.  
 
The increased criminalisation of migrants – both at legislative and enforcement 
levels – represents a widespread desire to control and criminalise migration, and 
the portrayal of migrants as deviant. It marks a shift in our society, towards what 
David Garland23 has called the Culture of Control – the increased public desire for 
more punitive measures met with the expansion of formal social control. As we 
will see in the following section, many refugees and asylum seekers were 
prosecuted and convicted under these new laws even in cases where they had a 
statutory defence.24 This steady stream of cases led the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC), in 2012, to express concern that ‘hundreds of asylum 
                                                        
19 Mohammed and Osman [2007] EWCA Crim 2332. 
20 Aliverti, Crimes of Mobility. 
21 Christie, ‘Prosecuting the Persecuted in Scotland’. 
22Aliverti, Crimes of Mobility, p. 50. 
23 David Garland D, Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
24 The judgment of Mateta & Ors ([2013] EWCA Crim 1372) provides guidance on this defence, 
and its complexities in applyingit in practice. However, in  the same judgment, it makes clear that 
defence lawyers often failed to raise the existence of such a defence due to incorrect assumptions 
about the nature of the case. In paragraph 30 in Mateta ‘It is sufficiently clear from the 
attendance notes compiled by the applicant's solicitors, along with their response to the Grounds 
of Appeal and the contents of the brief to counsel, that the availability of the defence under s. 31 
was never raised with the applicant, on the basis of the incorrect assumption that there was no 
potential defence to the charge.’ 
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seekers and refugees’ may have been wrongly convicted after being advised to 
plead guilty to offences relating to their entry to the UK.25  
 
 
Reactive responses to ‘asylum cases’ by the CCRC 
 
The CCRC, a non-governmental body, was established in March 1997 under 
section 8 of the Criminal Appeals Act 1995. It reviews possible miscarriages of 
justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.26 Those who believe they have 
been wrongly convicted, and have exhausted other avenues of appeal, can apply 
to the CCRC to have their case reviewed; in most cases, for this to happen, there 
must be a new argument or evidence not raised at trial or on appeal that 
presents a realistic chance that the appeal court would overturn the conviction.27 
The CCRC is the only body with the power to refer cases back to the appeal court 
for a re-hearing and a final decision on whether a conviction should be upheld or 
quashed. It thus works as a last resort for those who believe they have been 
wrongly convicted. The CCRC accepts applications related to any criminal 
conviction from the Crown or Magistrates’ Courts, but their referrals to the 
appeal court are comprised mainly of convictions for serious offences such as 
homicide, sexual assault, and robbery.28  
 
This section focuses on the CCRC’s handling of ‘asylum cases’, in which refugees 
or asylum seekers have been convicted of entering the UK with a false 
identification document or no document at all. While CCRC referrals back to the 
appeal court have historically involved more serious offences, as noted above, 
the number of asylum case referrals has risen in the last four years and currently 
occupies a large proportion of referrals.29 Between April 2015 and March 2016, 
the CCRC reviewed in total 1,797 cases and referred 33 cases (about 1.8 per 
cent) to the appeal court.30 Of these 33 cases, nine were asylum cases.31 We 
argue that asylum cases are distinct from other CCRC cases in two ways: the 
resources committed by the CCRC to reviewing these cases; and the ‘success’ rate 
                                                        
25 Yewa Holiday, ‘CCRC Concern over Advice Given to Refugees’ (Law Society Gazette, 14 June 
2012) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/ccrc-concern-over-advice-given-to-
refugees/66102.fullarticle>.  
26 This article does not deal with the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, established in 
1999. 
27 Under ‘exceptional circumstances’, the CCRC can waive the requirement for a previous appeal 
and for fresh evidence or argument. Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Formal Memorandum 
Exceptional Circumstances’ (2015) <http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Exceptional-Circumstances.pdf>. The CCRC reviews both convictions 
and sentences; this article focuses on the review of convictions.  
28 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’ (2016), p 11 
<http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CCRC-_1926236-v1-
56042_Criminal_Cases_Review_AR_v0_6_Final.pdf>.  
29 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15’ (2014), p 19 
<http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CCRC-Annual-Report-and-Accounts-
2014-15.pdf>. 
30 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’, p 80. Of the 33 
cases, seven were referred for a review of sentence only. 
31 Ibid, p 20. 
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of CCRC referrals measured by the proportion of convictions quashed by the 
appeal court.  
 
 
Asylum case applications: Atypical cases for the CCRC? 
 
Asylum cases not only account for a rising proportion of CCRC referrals but also 
have a higher probability of being quashed by the appeal court. By the end of 
March 2016, the CCRC had referred a total of 43 asylum cases. Of these, 32 
convictions were quashed, 3 upheld, 2 abandoned, and 6 were pending (see 
Table, below). Excluding pending and abandoned cases, the appeal court had 
quashed 32 of 35 cases referred by the CCRC, some 91 per cent of cases. In 
comparison, 68 per cent of all other (‘non-asylum’) convictions referred by the 
CCRC had been quashed (378 of 560) from its establishment in 1997 to August 
2016.32   
 
  
                                                        
32 For all cases, the CCRC has referred a total of 603 CCRC referrals, of which 410 appeals were 
allowed. Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Case Library – CCRC Case Statistics’ (no date) 
<http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/case-statistics/>. The figures include sentence-only referrals.  
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Table: CCRC asylum cases referred back to the appeal court 
 
 
Sources: Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘CCRC Annual Reports and Accounts’ 2006/07 through 
2015/16; Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Case Library’ (no date) <http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/case-
library/> accessed 30 August 2016; Laurie Elks, Righting the Miscarriages of Justice: Ten Years of the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission (Justice, 2008), p 264; fieldwork notes.   
Notes:  
 ‘Our sample’ refers to the cases analysed in detail for this article. For these cases, records including the 
application, case record, submission to the appeal court, internal correspondence and minutes of 
Case 
No.
CCRC 
receipt of 
application
CCRC 
Referral 
Date
Cour of 
Appeal - 
Date
Court of 
Appeal 
Decision 
Our 
sample 
Application-
Allocation 
(months)
Allocation - 
Referral 
(months)
Application 
- Referral 
(months)
1 2014 28-Jan-16 N/A Pending
2 2014 10-Feb-16 N/A Pending
3 2014 10-Feb-16 N/A Pending
4 2014 17-Feb-15 07-May-15 Abandoned
5 2014 24-Mar-15 07-May-15 Quashed
6 2014 24-Mar-15 07-May-15 Quashed
7 2014 22-Apr-15 03-Jul-15 Quashed
8 2014 24-Mar-15 17-Dec-15 Quashed
9 2014 24-Mar-15 17-Dec-15 Quashed
10 2013 13-Jul-15 N/A Pending
11 2013 20-Mar-15 14-May-15 Quashed
12 2013 15-Oct-15 N/A Pending
13 2013 15-Sep-14 07-Oct-14 Quashed
14 2013 10-Apr-14 18-Jul-14 Quashed
15 2013 23-May-14 11-Jul-14 Quashed
16 2012 15-Jan-16 N/A Pending
17 2012 17-Mar-15 07-May-15 Quashed
18 2012 29-May-15 26-Feb-16 Upheld
19 2012 24-Sep-15 26-Feb-16 Upheld
20 2012 01-Dec-14 22-Jul-15 Quashed
21 2012 14-Oct-14 18-Jun-15 Quashed
22 2012 24-Jun-14 17-Dec-14 Quashed X 12 7 19
23 2012 26-Nov-13 26-Jun-14 Quashed X 1.5 14 15.5
24 2012 12-Jun-13 30-Jul-13 Quashed X 1.5 6 7.5
25 2012 17-Apr-13 30-Jul-13 Quashed X 5 2 7
26 2012 28-Mar-13 30-Jul-13 Quashed X 6 4.5 10.5
27 2012 28-Mar-13 17-Jun-13 Quashed X 2 5 7
28 2012 28-Mar-13 17-Jun-13 Quashed X 2.5 4 6.5
29 2012 12-Jun-13 30-Jul-13 Quashed X 1.5 6 7.5
30 2012 12-Apr-13 17-Jun-13 Quashed X 0.5 6.5 7
31 2012 28-Mar-13 30-Jul-13 Abandoned X 1 6 7
32 2012 30-Mar-12 30-Apr-12 Quashed X 1 day 0 1 day
33 2011 29-Mar-12 30-Apr-12 Quashed X 2 1.5 3.5
34 2011 29-Mar-12 01-Jun-12 Quashed X 2 1 3
35 2011 20-Mar-12 18-Jun-12 Quashed X 2 10 12
36 2009 21-Mar-11 05-Jun-11 Quashed 6 13 19
37 2009 08-May-13 16-Dec-14 Upheld X 6 42 48
38 2008 10-Aug-10 14-Dec-10 Quashed X 5.5 17 22.5
39 2008 10-Aug-10 14-Dec-10 Quashed X 5.5 17 22.5
40 2007 18-Jun-07 11-Jul-07 Quashed X 4.5 0.5 5
41 2003 22-Jun-05 28-Oct-05 Quashed X 13 10 23
42 2002 22-Jun-05 28-Oct-05 Quashed X 24 8 32
43 2002 22-Jun-05 28-Oct-05 Quashed X 24 8 32
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meetings were reviewed. Interviews with caseworkers and commissioners and other CCRC personnel 
were also carried out on some of these cases. 
 ‘Allocation’ refers to the assignment of a case to a caseworker. 
 
Another factor that distinguishes the asylum cases from other CCRC cases is the 
time taken to review applications, both from ‘receipt of the application’ to 
‘allocation to a caseworker’, and from ‘allocation’ to the ‘decision to refer’ the 
case back to the appeal court.33 The CCRC has come under sustained criticism 
over the past decade or so for being too slow in its investigation of applications. 
Indeed, delays were a source of critique in the House of Commons Justice 
Committee on the CCRC in 2015, with discussion focusing on the increasing 
delays over recent years.34 Yet, the asylum cases seem to run counter to this 
trend. Cases that were first reviewed by the CCRC in 2002 took on average 32 
months from application to referral (see Table). The time spent on such cases 
between 2003 and 2009 averaged 23 months.35 But by 2011 and 2012, when the 
number of asylum cases rapidly increased, the CCRC was able to refer these cases 
in, on average, 9 months – less than half of the time it took in 2003–2009.36 Most 
of these applicants were ‘at liberty’, having already served their sentences, and 
this 9-month turnaround was considerably faster than the majority of other 
cases handled. During that time the CCRC had an 18-month target for allocating 
‘at liberty’ cases  to a caseworker, with the time taken for actually investigating a 
case typically adding on at least another six to twelve months.37  
 
The quicker turnaround for asylum cases since 2011 reflects both quicker 
allocation of applications to a caseworker and a more efficient review process. 
The change can be dated back to around 2008 and 2009 when caseworkers38  
with the responsibility for screening39  applications became keenly aware of the 
many similarities in asylum case applications.  A caseworker referred to one 
asylum case during screening as ‘another Thet + Osman type case’.40 In 2011, 
notes made during screening of another case included the statement: ‘it relates 
to false document offences committed as part of seeking asylum in the UK. 
                                                        
33 We focused on the time spent on cases which were referred to the Court of Appeal, and Table 
does not include cases where referrals were not made.  
34 House of Commons Justice Committee, 2015, Criminal Cases Review Commission: Twelfth 
Report of Session 2014-15, 17 March 2015, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/850/850.pdf 
35 The exception is Case 40, which took five months.   
36 This calculation excludes Case 32 as an outlier.  
37 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2011/12’(2012), p 11. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229065/03
90.pdf>. 
38 While both Commissioners and caseworkers are involved in decision making at the CCRC for 
the purpose of this article, both groups are referred to as caseworkers so as not to risk 
identification of specific personnel. 
39 As with all applications to the CCRC, these cases are first subject to a reasonably quick review 
by an experienced member of staff, a review referred to as ‘screening’. Only if ‘screening’ fails to 
identify possible avenues to investigate, will the application be rejected at this stage. Where there 
are possible grounds, a more thorough review will be conducted by a caseworker. Note, in all 
examples, the female pronoun is used. 
40 The quotation is taken from the ‘Case Records’ (case 38 in the Table). 
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[Name of caseworker] is our expert in this area’41 – another instance of asylum 
cases being viewed as a distinct category, where particular expertise is 
developing in the organisation. This caseworker was assigned to 7 out of 11 
cases that the CCRC received between 2002 and 2011, and continued to be 
consulted in other subsequent cases.42 
 
Accumulation of expertise on comparable cases had the effect of reducing the 
time spent in preparing a case for a referral (as well as in deciding which cases 
had no grounds for a referral, though we do not deal with such cases here). By 
2011, after six cases had been referred to the appeal court, previous referral 
documents were used as templates for further cases. In May 2011, a CCRC 
‘Casework Guidance Note’ titled ‘Asylum and Immigration Issues in Casework’, 
was written by the same experienced caseworker mentioned above, and 
provided an overview of relevant laws and advice on how to approach these 
cases. Once asylum cases had been identified by the CCRC as a distinct category, 
they were processed efficiently, delivering speedy justice for refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
 
 
Amassing critical expertise 
 
The ability to identify an ‘asylum case’, however, did not come easily.  Similar to 
other criminal justice agencies, the CCRC made several errors before being able 
to spot asylum cases in new applications and track past cases they had 
previously turned down. They had initially rejected three cases (30, 34 and 41 in 
the Table) during screening. In two cases the applicants reapplied and their case 
was reviewed and referred; in another case the CCRC later proactively subjected 
the case to a second review and referred it. Case 41 refers to an application from 
2003, before the 2004 Act was in place. It was one of the earliest cases; only two 
other asylum cases were being reviewed by the CCRC at the time, and these had 
not yet been referred. These cases demonstrate that the CCRC – like other key 
stakeholders such as defence lawyers and the CPS – was also not yet fully 
familiar with the law as well as the political and geographical contexts of such 
cases. The CCRC had at that stage not fully realised that these early cases – in 
which the 1999 Act and the 2004 Act had not provided the protection as 
intended – were not sporadic, but were indicative of a larger cluster of cases 
where refugees and asylum seekers had been wrongly advised by defence 
lawyers and hence wrongly convicted.   
 
More puzzling, however, are the two cases that were screened out years later, in 
2011, when the CCRC was clearly familiar with such asylum cases and had 
developed some expertise in dealing with them. When case 34 was initially 
rejected at screening in March 2011, seven CCRC referrals of asylum cases had 
resulted in quashed convictions and one was awaiting a decision by the appeal 
court. Case 34 was initially rejected because the applicant had not already 
                                                        
41 The quotation is taken from page 3 of the ‘Case Records’ (case 33 in the Table). 
42 The caseworker provided input into cases 27, 30 and 31 in the Table before leaving the CCRC 
in September 2013.  
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appealed his conviction.43 When the applicant’s legal representative reapplied to 
the CCRC, a different caseworker identified the error made in reviewing the first 
application and prioritised the application for an immediate review. She noted, 
‘We ought to have recognised the referral issue when dealing with the previous 
application and have caused unnecessary delay.’44 The third case that the CCRC 
had erroneously screened out (case 30) was identified after an internal review of 
previously rejected cases conducted in 2012, at a stage when the CCRC realised 
that there were systemic problems with such cases. These cases were screened 
out due to applicants’ pleading guilty in a Magistrates’ Court case.  
 
The CCRC originally thought that these applicants should appeal their 
convictions to the appeal court before writing to the CCRC. Later, it realised that 
since the applicants had pleaded guilty in a Magistrates’ Court, rather than in the 
Crown Court, they were unable to appeal their convictions other than through a 
referral by the CCRC under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. 
Hence, the initial rejections had been in error. As for the treatment of guilty 
pleas, before the wave of asylum cases reached the CCRC, it regularly turned 
down cases where applicants had pleaded guilty at trial based on case law which 
views guilty pleas as a sign of acceptance of, and remorse for, the crime 
committed.45 It referred guilty plea cases back to the appeal courts only under 
limited circumstances, for example, where the plea was entered under duress, 
where there was erroneous legal advice, and where the guilty pleas were a result 
of an erroneous ruling on a point of law by the trial judge.46 Therefore, in asylum 
cases, the CCRC was able to argue that applicants had pleaded guilty because 
they mistakenly believed, based on poor advice from their lawyers, that they had 
no defence.47  
 
Accepting guilty pleas allows for a speedy trial as well as sparing witnesses and 
victims the trauma of giving evidence at court. However, it also carries the risk of 
compromising principles such as the presumption of innocence, and the burden 
of proof resting with the prosecution – both of which can negatively affect 
defendants. Vulnerable defendants are more likely to suffer the negative 
consequences of incentives for timely guilty pleas, such as those who are unable 
to make an informed choice, or those who do not have sufficient funds to hire a 
good lawyer.48 While defence lawyers should not be excused for their erroneous 
                                                        
43 While ordinarily those who believe themselves to be wrongly convicted need to exhaust their 
direct appeals before applying to the CCRC, applications can, in ‘exceptional circumstances’ be 
considered from those who have not done so. 
44 ‘Case Record’, p 3, case 34, Table. 
45 R v Boal [1992] 95 Cr App R 272. 
46 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Response by the Criminal Cases Review Commission’,  
2016. <http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CCRC-Sentencing-Council-
consultation-April-2016.pdf.>. 
47 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Statement of Reasons’ (2012), para 61 (case 34 in Table). 
48 Andrew Ashworth & Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th ed.), chapter 10 (OUP, 2010)  
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advice, asylum cases highlight that the system which relies on guilty pleas plays a 
role in the wrongful conviction of these vulnerable defendants.49  
 
The CCRC dealt admirably with these three ‘missed’ cases. It has been 
transparent with applicants about these mistakes, noting in one referral 
document, for example, that an applicant ‘was informed, incorrectly – for which 
the Commission apologises.’50 These missed cases remind us of biases that 
operate at all levels of decision-making, including the CCRC. We may expect 
organisations to apply a normative theory of decision-making, where all relevant 
information is gathered and a decision is reached in a rational and logical 
manner.51 Studies have shown, however, that deviations from the normative 
model of decision-making are widespread and human decision-making involves 
biases.52 In the field of marketing, ‘emotional buying’ and ‘stereotype perceptions 
of supplier country’ are examples of biases that routinely operate.53 While these 
biases may work as useful heuristics to help make quicker and ‘good enough’ 
decisions, they could also lead to bad decisions especially if biases are not 
acknowledged.  
 
In asylum cases, the CCRC may have been influenced by what Tversky and 
Kahneman called the ‘reference point bias’.54 During decision-making, certain 
information (‘anchors’) can sometimes dominate judgements. An ‘anchor’ can 
frame what is relevant to consider and what solutions are worth considering. 
The existence of guilty pleas or the political and legislative discourse that 
portrayed migrants as ‘deviant’ since the late 1990s may have operated as 
anchors, leading those responsible for screening to miss these unsafe convictions 
until they were identified as a distinct category of cases.   
 
 
Asylum cases as ‘slam dunk’ referrals?  
In comparison to the total referral rate of 1.8 per cent for all cases (see section 
Reactive responses to ‘asylum cases’ by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 
                                                        
49 The CCRC responded cautiously in April 2016 to the Sentencing Council’s proposal on 
reduction in sentence for ‘early’ guilty pleas. Currently, a sentence reduction of a third must be 
entered at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’ which is interpreted differenty by judges. The 
Sentencing Council is proposing that defendants must plead guilty the first time they are asked 
for their plea.   
50 Criminal Case Review Commission, ‘Statement of Reasons’, p 7 for case 34 in the Table.  
51 Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, (Harvard University Press, 1947).  
52 Deviations from the rational decision-making has been documented in finance, accounting and 
marketing, for example. Robert J Shiller, ‘From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 83-104; Klaus Backhaus & Franz-Karl 
Koch, ‘Behavioral industrial marketing research in Germany and the United States – a 
comparison’, Journal of Business Research, 1985, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 375-82; Michael H Birnbaum & 
Linda G Hynan, ‘Judgments of salary bias and test bias from statistical evidence’, Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1986, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 266-79.  
53 Craig R Carter, Lutz Kaufmann, & Alex Michel, ‘Behavourial supply management: a taxonomy of 
judgement and decision-making biases’, International Journal of Physical Disrtribution and 
Logostics Management, 2007, Vol. 37, No. 8, pp. 631-669.  
54 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases’, 
Science, 1974, No. 185, pp. 1124-31.  
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above), the CCRC’s referral rate for asylum cases is high, at 27 per cent.55 It might 
seem that asylum cases provided a chance for the CCRC to increase its low 
referral rate for which it has been criticised.56 Once an application has passed the 
initial screening stage, the CCRC conducts a detailed review to determine 
whether the applicant’s conviction was unsafe. In such cases, this review focuses 
on information about the applicant, her country of origin, and her journey to the 
UK: What was the political/human rights situation in that country? What 
biographical and contextual data is available on the applicant, and what were her 
reasons for fleeing her country? Did she travel directly to the UK and, if not, 
where did she stop during transit, and for how long?  
 
The information is appraised with reference to statutory defences available 
under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and 
the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The CCRC might, for example, review 
what constitutes a ‘reasonable excuse’ for not being in possession of a legitimate 
travel document under the 2004 Act, as relevant to Soe Thet v DPP; or the 
meaning of ‘coming directly’ to the UK under the 1999 Act, as relevant to Adimi 
and confirmed in Asfaw and Mateta.57 The proportion of cases where convictions 
were quashed following a CCRC referral is testament to the CCRC’s ability to 
make a case to the appeal court that a statutory defence exists.58  
 
One possible response to this high success rate is to argue that the CCRC has 
referred only ‘slam dunk’ cases; that there must be a considerable number of 
cases that they are equivocal about and therefore that they reject. The 
organisation has long been criticised by Michael Naughton and others for being 
too ‘deferential’ to the appeal court and being afraid to refer cases that may be 
                                                        
55 According to the CCRC, it has to date received between 150 and 170 asylum applications. 
Twenty-one per cent is calculated by using 160 asylum case applications divided by the total 
number of referrals.  
56 House of Commons Justice Committee, 2015, p 8. 
57 Soe Thet v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] EWCH 2701 (Admin); R v Uxbridge 
Magistrates Court ex parte Adimi [1999] EWHC Admin 765; R v Asfaw [2008] UKHL 31; R v. 
Mateta & and Ors [2013] EWCA Crim 1372.  
58 Yewa Holiday has written extensively on the issues raised in the CCRC asylum cases, including: 
‘A Place of Greater Safety: The Prosecution of Refugees for Passport Offences’ (Border 
Criminologies, University of Oxford, 26 February 2014) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-
subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2014/02/place-greater>; 
‘CCRC Concern over Advice Given to Refugees’ (The Law Society Gazette, 14 June 2012) 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/ccrc-concern-over-advice-given-to-
refugees/66102.fullarticle>; ‘In Defence of Refugees’ (The Law Society Gazette, 16 September 
2013) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/in-defence-of-refugees/5037642.fullarticle>; 
‘Penalising Refugees: When Should the CJEU Have Jurisdiction to Interpret Article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention?’ (EU Law Analysis, 2014) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/penalising-refugees-when-should-cjeu.html>. 
‘Prosecuting the Persecuted: The Impact of Wrongful Convictions for Refugees’ (The Justice Gap, 
23 January 2014) <http://thejusticegap.com/2014/01/prosecuting-persecuted-impact-
wrongful-convictions-refugees/>; ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers without Passports to Appeal UK 
Convictions’ (The Justice Gap, 23 April 2015) <http://thejusticegap.com/2015/04/syrian-
asylum-seekers-without-passports-to-appeal-uk-convictions/>.  
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rejected.59 This does not seem to be the case with asylum cases. Here, it has 
referred cases that challenged the existing interpretation of section 31 of the 
1999 Act and section 2 of the 2004 Act. For example, it has attempted, in several 
referrals (e.g. cases 24, 29, 33, 35 and 41 in Table), to test the ‘liberal 
interpretation’ confirmed in Asfaw of what constitutes ‘coming directly’ to the 
UK.60  While Article 31 of the Refugee Convention requires refugees to come 
‘directly’ from their country of origin, the term ‘directly’ has been interpreted to 
allow transits to an intermediate country. The elements to consider are the 
length of the stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying the trip to 
their final destination, and whether or not the refugee sought or found 
protection de jure or de facto from the persecution from which he or she was 
seeking to escape.   
 
 
One case that stands out – which was upheld by the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division – concerned an Ethiopian national who entered Britain using his own 
passport on a visitor’s visa (case 37). He later claimed asylum, stating he fled the 
country due to fear of repercussions from his membership of the Oromo 
Liberation Front. He did this, however, under a different name and lied during 
the asylum interview, resulting in his claim being rejected. He was charged with 
seeking leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a refugee by deception.61 
Although the applicant had legally entered and been legally present in the UK, 
therefore not meeting the definition of a refugee or an asylum seeker, the CCRC 
attempted to push the current interpretation of the law on defence available 
under section 31 of the 1999 Act. It supplied medical evidence, which was 
consistent with torture, and highlighted the risks associated with returning the 
applicant to Ethiopia.  
 
A generous interpretation of the Real Possibility Test 
Academics differ on the purpose of the CCRC as a casework organisation. As 
noted above, the CCRC has been criticised for being too legalistic and 
retrospective, focusing too narrowly on the ‘real possibility test’. This statutory 
test for referral, under section 13(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, requires 
the CCRC to only refer cases where there is a ‘real possibility’ that the conviction 
would be considered unsafe by the Court of Appeal by presenting an argument 
or evidence not raised at trial. Critics argue that this due process model makes 
the CCRC too deferential and compromises its independence from the Court of 
                                                        
59 Michael Naughton, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent?’ (2007, 
Palgrave Macmillan); House of Commons, ‘Justice – Twelfth Report: Criminal Cases Review 
Commission’ (2015) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/850/85002.htm>; 
Richard Nobles and David Schiff, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success?’ 
The Modern Law Review, 2001, pp. 280-299.  
60 Holiday, ‘CCRC Concern over Advice Given to Refugees’. 
61 R v Eyasu Mulugeta, Farhiya Mohamed Issa, Bahram Firouzi [2015] EWCA Crim 6. Case 37 
concerns Eyasu Mulugeta. 
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Appeal, as it must always second-guess the Court’s decisions.62 It is also argued 
that the strict application of the real possibility test may assist in the quashing of 
convictions of the factually guilty, and in some cases may be unable to refer 
potentially factually innocent cases that are unable to satisfy the real possibility 
test.63 Others have noted the risks of focusing too much on factual innocence, and 
pressed the need for due process.64 The above case of an Ethiopian national 
suggests that in asylum cases, great efforts were made by the CCRC to protect 
vulnerable applicants; it did so by referring to the appeal court cases that did not 
meet its usual standard of the real possibility test and by attempting to stretch 
the interpretation of the current case law and legislation.  
The next section goes beyond the CCRC’s handling of individual cases as a 
‘reactive’65 organisation in correcting misccariges of justice that have already 
occured. It examines more widely the purpose of the CCRC as an organisation 
that could prevent future miscarriages of justice and provide helpful feedback to 
other criminal justice agencies.  
 
Keeping the system honest: Proactive responses by the CCRC  
 
The vision statement on the CCRC’s website lists three elements of its role: ‘to 
enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system’, ‘to give hope and bring 
justice to those wrongly convicted’, and ‘to contribute to reform and 
improvements in the law based on our experience.’66 The second point suggests 
the CCRC is a case-based organisation, whereas the first and third points indicate 
a much wider role, highlighting the organisation’s commitment to improve the 
justice system as whole. While the CCRC has no legal obligation to carry out 
wider engagement activities under the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, it is better 
placed than any other body to do so, as it sees failings across the whole criminal 
process – from the police, through prosecution service, defence counsel, and the 
courts.  
 
The House of Commons Justice Select Committee recently pointed out that the 
CCRC is not using its unique position sufficiently to feed back into the criminal 
                                                        
62 Michael Naughton, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Innocence versus safety and the 
integrity of the criminal justice system’, Criminal Law Quarterly, 2012, vol. 58, pp. 207-244; Clive 
Walker, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and the Correction of Error’, in McConville, M. & Wilson, G. (eds.) 
The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process, pp. 505-524, (OUP, 2002). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hannah Quirk, ‘Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer’ 
Modern Law Review, 2007, 70(5) pp. 759-777; Carolyn Hoyle, ‘Compensating Injustice: The Perils 
of the Innocence Discourse’ in Young, S.M., Hunter, J., Roberts, P., and Dixon, D (eds), The Integrity 
of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice, (Hart, 2016). 
65 Nobles and Schiff  ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success?’, p.292 used 
the term ‘reactive’ to describe the work of the CCRC.  
66 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Who We Are’ (no date) 
<http://ccrc.wpengine.com/about-us/who-we-are/>.  
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justice system.67 The same point was made by Laurie Elks – an ex-caseworker at 
the CCRC in his book Righting the Miscarriages of Justice? Ten Years of the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission. He argued that there has been ‘very limited 
debate within the Commission about the directions of criminal justice policy and 
meetings of the Commission members have been predominantly concerned with 
internal and organisational issues.’68 The CCRC also reiterated this traditional 
stance in the 2015/16 Annual Report, which stated that ‘the Commission is 
fundamentally a caseworking organisation which seeks first and foremost to deal 
with cases in a fair and timely manner.’69  
 
The fact that the CCRC views itself primarily as a casework organisation may be 
attributed to the history of the establishment of the organisation. The Runciman 
Commission, following a series of high profile wrongful convictions, such as the 
Birmingham Six case, recommended the establishment of an independent 
organisation to review allegations of miscarriages of justice.70 Young and 
Sanders argue, however, that the Runciman Commission did not recommend the 
creation of an independent review body (now the CCRC) in order to improve the 
overall standard of the criminal justice system.71 The Runciman Commission 
understood that ‘fundamentals of the system were sound, and that what was 
needed was fine tuning in certain key areas.’ 72 If we take the view that wrongful 
conviction cases are ‘the occasional products of a special set of circumstances’73, 
the CCRC may be right to see itself as a casework organisation without the need 
to correct systemic practices of other criminal justice agencies.  
 
Nevertheless, the CCRC has revealed a recent appetite for going beyond a narrow 
remit. Its 2015/16 Annual Report details plans to design a system to capture 
lessons learnt from casework and share them with all relevant parts of the 
justice system,74 with the sections on ‘feeding back to the criminal justice system’ 
and ‘feeding back in the future’ focusing mainly on asylum cases. Indeed, within 
the criminal justice system, the CCRC is not alone in responding to external 
pressure in expanding its remit. For example, the CPS originally saw itself as a 
casework organisation: deciding which cases should be prosecuted and 
presenting cases at court.75 However, in response to a 2002 government report – 
Justice for All – which argued that victims should be at the heart of the criminal 
                                                        
67 House of Commons, ‘Justice – Twelfth Report: Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2015) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/850/85002.htm>., 
para 52. The second author gave evidence to the Justice Select Committee to that effect. 
68 Laurie Elks, Righting the Miscarriages of Justice? Ten Years of the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (2008, Justice).  
69 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’, p 34. 
70 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, Cm 2263 (HMSO, 1993). 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/22
63.pdf> 
71 Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: A Confidence 
Trick?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, 14(3) pp. 435-448. 
72 Ibid. p. 436. 
73 Ibid. p.447. 
74 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’, p 35. 
75 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘What we do’ (no date) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/about/>. 
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justice system, the CPS expanded its remit to provide support and assistance to 
victims and prosecution witnesses.76  Victims and witnesses are kept up to date 
about their cases, victims’s views are solicited, and in some cases they can 
discuss their cases directly with prosecutors. While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to examine the legitimacy of putting victims’ needs central to the criminal 
justice system, the CPS’ expanded remit created tentions between its role as 
representing the state and its new role as becoming a voice for victims. For the 
CCRC, going beyond casework, in asylum cases, meant engaging directly in 
critical dialogue with other criminal justice agencies.  
 
The CCRC – in pursuing its wider remit – asserted that these wrongful 
convictions represent ‘a failure by all of those involved, police, UKBA, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers, and the courts, to understand and apply the 
criminal law correctly’.77 It  criticised the CPS and defence lawyers in particular. 
Employees, including the chairman, have written regularly for legal magazines 
and newspapers. This started in June 2012 with an article in the Law Society 
Gazette entitled ‘CCRC Concern over Advice Given to Refugees’, followed by two 
more articles in the same magazine in October 2012 and September 2013.78 In 
December 2013, the CCRC’s press releases about asylum case referrals began to 
make clear that the CCRC was actively trying to raise awareness of the issue.79  
 
In addition to raising awareness through the media, the CCRC wrote directly to 
key stakeholders with the aim of preventing unsafe convictions of asylum cases. 
In September 2011, letters were sent to the CPS and the UK Border Agency 
alerting them to cases the CCRC had reviewed and referred back to the appeal 
court.80  The CCRC gave presentations to the Criminal Bar Association in April 
2012, defence lawyers in September 2012, relevant NGOs in August 2012, and 
prisons between June and October 2012.81 It also communicated with the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority in 201482 and again in 2015 to raise concerns 
about the conduct of solicitors.83  
 
In an article published by The Guardian in 2014, the CCRC urged defence lawyers 
not to advise clients to plead guilty ‘inappropriately’ and the CPS not to ‘bring 
prosecutions unnecessarily or wrongly.’84 It has also used referral documents to 
the appeal court to assert the incompetency of the CPS. In one case, the CPS had 
                                                        
76 Ibid; Andrew Sanders, ‘The CPS – 30 years on’, Criminal Law Review, 2016, vol.2, 82-98. 
77 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2013/2014’, p 7–8. 
78 Holiday, ‘Victims of Human Trafficking and the CCRC’ (Law Society Gazette, 25 October 2012) 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/victims-of-human-trafficking-and-the-
ccrc/67995.fullarticle>; Holiday, ‘CCRC Concern over Advice Given to Refugees’; Holiday, ‘In 
Defence of Refugees’; Foster, ‘Wrongful Prosecutions’.  
79 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Commission Refers the Conviction of Busani Zondo’ 
(2013) <http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/commission-refers-the-conviction-of-busani-zondo/>.  
80 Notes from internal CCRC correspondence minutes of meetings.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Notes from internal CCRC correspondence minutes of meetings. 
83 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16’, p 35. 
84 Richard Foster, ‘Wrongful Prosecutions Add to Refugee Woe’ (The Guardian, 24 February 
2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/feb/24/wrongful-prosecutions-refugee-woe>.  
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prosecuted a Somali national even though it was clear that Somalia had not had a 
passport-issuing authority since 1991 and that the defendant would have been 
unable to produce a valid passport upon entry to the UK. The CCRC criticised the 
CPS for their decision to prosecute when there should have been ‘no realistic 
prospect of success’ and for taking ‘advantage of the error of the defence in 
advising a guilty plea’.85  
 
The organisation that appears to have been the most responsive is the Solicitors’ 
Regulation Authority, which made a commitment to look into the quality of 
advice given to defendants seeking asylum.86 In January 2016, the Authority 
published a report on current practices concerning asylum-related legal advice.87 
They are also investigating a number of serious allegations concerning the 
competency of certain individual lawyers. The Law Society issued a new practice 
note in December 2015 entitled ‘Statutory Defences Available to Asylum Seekers 
Charged with Document Offences.’88 The UK Border Agency confirmed that their 
guidance team had studied the note and – in November 2013 – had already taken 
steps to bring it to the attention of investigators.  The CCRC was invited to one of 
their Senior Investigators Forums to ‘bolster’ the point.89 The CPS was rather 
more difficult to budge. They refused to do a retrospective ‘trawl’ of past cases 
due to financial constraints, but they did, eventually, update their guidance in 
relation to section 31 of the 1999 Act in February 2013.90 Overall, evidence of the 
impact of the CCRC’s wider engagement can be seen in the increased number of 
such applications, particularly in 2013/14.91 Refugees as well as their legal 
representatives have contacted the CCRC after reading the various articles. 92 
More recently, applications to the CCRC concerning asylum cases have been 
declining which suggests that these cases are either not being prosecuted or 
properly defended.  
 
 
Conclusion 
  
                                                        
85 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Statement of Reasons’ (2012), para 17–18, para 54 (case 
34 in Table).   
86 The Solicitors Regulation Authority wrote: ‘We are currently reviewing a number of matters 
referred by the Criminal Cases Review Commission concerning the quality of advice given to 
defendants seeking asylum. Using the findings from these reviews, we expect to publish ethics 
guidance on the handling of cases where asylum may be relevant to the client’s defence.’  
Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Risk Outlook 2014/2015, Autumn 2014 Update’ (2014) 
<https://www.sra.org.uk/risk/outlook/risk-outlook-autumn-2014-update.page>.  
87 Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Quality of Legal Services for Asylum Seekers’ (2016) 
<http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/asylum-report.page#findings>.  
88 Law Society, ‘Statutory Defences Available to Asylum Seekers Charged with Document 
Offences’ (2015) <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-
notes/statutory-defences-available-to-asylum-seekers-charged-with-document-offences/>. 
89 Interview with a former caseworker on 13 February 2014. 
90 Interview with a senior manager on 29 September 2014.  
91 Criminal Cases Review Commission, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15’, p 13. 
92 Interview with a former caseworker on 13 February 2014.  
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To put the blame on defence lawyers as the cause of miscarriages of justice in 
asylum cases would be too simplistic. It is true that had defence lawyers been 
aware of the statutory defence available, the wrongful conviction of asylum 
seekers and refugees could have been prevented. This article, however, has 
argued that these asylum cases demonstrate a wider organisational bias 
influencing decision-making across all criminal justice agencies. The wrongful 
convictions of asylum seekers and refugees reflect, to some extent, a shift in 
society towards what David Garland93 has called the Culture of Control – the 
increased public desire for more punitive measures met with the expansion of 
formal social control. The widespread political and public desire to control and 
criminalise migration, and the portrayal of migrants as deviant, may have 
operated as ‘anchors’, leading criminal justice agencies to overlook their 
statutory protection and move away from a ‘due process model’ to a ‘crime 
control model’ in asylum cases.94 Behind the failure of defence lawyers, a host of 
other agencies were also under the influence of the ‘crimmigration’95 anchoring. 
  
Asylum cases began to present challenges for the CCRC in the mid-2000s. They 
were, in part, the product of the large number of immigration-related offences 
created by the Labour government. The UK Border Agency, tasked with ‘cracking 
down’ on abuse of immigration rules, relied on criminal law instead of dealing 
with migrants administratively. The CPS proceeded with prosecutions where 
there was no case to answer, and defence lawyers failed to advise their clients of 
their defence under Article 31 of the 1991 Act and section 2 of the 2004 Act. The 
courts wrongly convicted refugees and asylum seekers, causing further harm to 
these vulnerable people who had fled intolerable living conditions in their 
country of origin.  
 
When asylum cases first reached the CCRC, it also failed to notice the ‘anchors’ 
and erred by rejecting some of these cases. After some errors, the Commission 
became aware of systemic failings by criminal justice agencies and responded 
efficiently and effectively, referring 43 convictions back to the appeal court, most 
of which were quashed. It has been criticised for delays in its work and the 
timidity of its approach to referrals. These asylum case referrals, however, are a 
powerful counter to this. They show the CCRC fulfilling its remit to identify 
potential miscarriages of justice and feed back into the criminal justice system in 
order to improve due process in an exemplary fashion.  
 
The wider significance of the proactive approach taken by the CCRC speaks to 
the importance of communication – or the lack thereof – between all criminal 
justice and related agencies. Focusing on the CPS, Sanders has recently drawn 
attention to the lack of effective communication between the CPS and the police 
over the last 30 years.96 There are also wide variations within prosecution and 
                                                        
93 Garland D, Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. 
94 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, 1968). 
95 Juliet Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power’, American 
University Law Review 56, no. 2 (December 2006), pp: 367-419. 
96 Sanders, ‘The CPS – 30 years on’. 
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regulatory agencies – CPS, Health and Safety Executive,  Office of Fair Trading or 
environment agency – in their attitudes to prosecution.97 For cases involving 
death, while the CPS’s ‘default setting’98 is to prosecute, the Health and Safety 
Executive prosecutes only 1 per cent of work-related deaths.99 The 
‘fragmentation’ of prosecution policies demonstrates the absence of a clear 
principle on prosecution and poor inter-agency communication.100  
 
The CCRC’s initiative in communicating directly and critically with criminal 
justice and related agencies in asylum cases, however, was not its usual style of 
correcting miscarriages of justice. In other cases, it generally preferred not to 
criticise agency practices; in cases that it did criticse, it did so indirectly in the 
statement of reasons for individual cases. The reluctance of criminal justice 
agencies to criticise another agency is not unique to the CCRC. The CPS has also 
failed to take a strong stance against police malpractice.101 It remains to be seen 
whether the CCRC’s proactive approach in asylum cases marks a new beginning 
for the CCRC as a proactive organisation or a one-off initiative. Whichever the 
case, the CCRC was right to speak up and remind all the agencies about the 
protection asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  
 
The response from criminal justice agencies to the CCRC’s campaign to raise 
awareness of ‘asylum cases’ has overall been positive. Asylum case applications 
to the CCRC have recently declined, and criminal justice agencies have tried to 
put in places changes to reduce the chance of further wrongful convictions. This 
reinforces the view that the CCRC is in a unique position to feed back into the 
criminal justice system, and that criminal justice agencies will be responsive.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
97 Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, ‘The Ethics of Prosecution Lawyers’, Legal Ethics, 7(2), pp. 
190-209, 2004. 
98 Sanders, The CPS – 30 years on’, Criminal Law Review, p.89. 
99 Young and Sanders, p.197. 
100 Ibid, p.199. 
101 The police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and the death of Sean Riggs after being put in 
a cage in a police station car park are two examples where the CPS was reluctant to criticise its 
peers (see Sanders, The CPS – 30 years on’, Criminal Law Review, p92). 
